The time on Bachelard’s epistemology

Abstract

The arising of the theory of the Relativity at the beginning at the beginning of century XX reed-echo in the slight knowledge we had on the time. This repercussion reached the philosophical way, taking several philosophers, amongst them Henri Bergson and Gaston Bachelard, to pronunce on the new conceptions. Bergson already possessed a philosophical conception on the time structuralized in the moment of the emergence of the Theory of Relativity of Albert Einstein. If it cannot affim, therefore, that the publication of book Durée et Simultanéité, in 1922, means the elaboration of a secular vision, but only one reflection of its conception ahead of the theories of Einstein. The secular perspective of Bergson is the duration , where the subject plays an elementary role, to the being it who establishes the duration idea, through idea, through the memory, when creating the constrain between the past and the future. Already the time in the scope of the epistemology of Bachelard takes opposing vision to the mentioned one, where it is conceived as instants without duration. In this measure, the conscience has the role to make the linking between the past and the future through the habit, that would be the element solderer in a reality where everything occurs in isolated instants. It is perceived, therefore, that the vision of Bachelard of time does not do without the role of the conscience, that is, keeps it to it. In such a way, it is possible to think about a rupture between the conceptions of Bachelard and Bergson, where the secular reality of the Physics of Einstein supports that the real time is that one in one determined point of the space-time, that is, of a time existing in fact in the external reality to the being?